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Recent Developments in Social Welfare Law and the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
WILLIAM H. TAFT IV*
INTRODUCTION:

THE EVOLVING

CONCEPT OF A SEPARATION

OF POWERS

In the past decade the federal government has dramatically increased
both the volume and significance of its social welfare legislation and
programs. In the protection of civil rights, the provision of educational
and health services as well as the enormous expansion of its traditional
income support programs, it has exerted an influence which has fundamentally changed the existing social structure of this country. The daily
activities of individual citizens have been redetermined by this social
legislation; deeply held, though often unpublicized attitudes have been
embodied in or repudiated by federal law, and economic opportunities in
traditionally private fields have been both created for and denied to certain
people by statute or implementing regulations.
Undoubtedly, these developments have revealed and, in some cases,
created tensions in the society as a whole. The traditional relationship
between federal, state and local governments and the private sector in the
field of social welfare has been altered beyond recognition. Much less
frequently noticed are the substantial strains which these developments
have placed on the relationship between the three branches of the federal
government. The doctrine of separation of powers, which is both the
foundation and the goal of those relationships, has been correspondingly
affected.
Separation of powers is inherent in the scheme of the first three articles
of the Constitution. A distinction between legislative, executive and
judicial power is presumed, and each power is vested in a separate branch.
The concept of separation of powers was so familiar to the framers that it
was incorporated in the Constitution without positive articulation; unless
specific provision is made for coordinate action, as in the case of the veto or
the appointment power, each branch is supreme within its sphere.
The most superficial consideration of the need to make distinctions
between the legislative, executive and judicial functions is sufficient,
however, to suggest that the separation of powers is not intended to isolate
the different branches from each other. Indeed, each depends on the
*Member of the District of Columbia Bar, presently associated with Leva, Hawes,
Symington, Martin & Oppenheimer; General Counsel to the Department of Health,
Education & Welfare, 1976-77; Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education &
Welfare, 1973-76; B.A. 1966, Yale College; J.D. 1969, Harvard Univ.
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cooperation of the other two for its own actions to be effective, and each
may command or restrain the conduct of the others as may be necessary to
carry out its own responsibilities. Thus, Madison wrote that "no skill in
the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define,
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces - the legislative,
executive, and judiciary." 1 In a later paper Madison acknowledged that the
meaning of the doctrine of the separation of powers "can amount to no
more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. ' 2 That
each branch will attempt to exercise control over and exert pressure on the
others in carrying out its own responsibilities is clearly contemplated; it
was- sufficient for Madison that "none of them ought to possess, directly or
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of
their respective powers. '"
In a society where the role of government, though strong within its
sphere, is limited and generally operates in the pursuit of widely accepted
objectives, such as defense, law enforcement, management of public lands
and the providing of essential public services, the lines between the
legislative, executive and judicial powers can be perceived and applied in
most cases without difficulty.
Formulating the law is considerably
facilitated when objectives are widely shared and well known. Legislation
can accurately express, whether broadly or narrowly, the policy intended by
Congress. The enforcement of the law, i.e. the application of that policy
over time, is not likely to involve the resolution of subsidiary policy issues,
and where it does, it will be relatively clear that those issues either are
genuinely subsidiary to the major policy or are in fact committed to
executive discretion. Thus, where policy can be clearly expressed and its
implications are, if not clear, at least generally predictable, the need for the
executive to make policy in applying laws is correspondingly diminished.
When government becomes responsible for the development and
administration of policies to regulate the economy and to establish
conditions for the conduct of commercial activity, as it has through
antitrust law, collective bargaining legislation and regulation of cormodity prices, distinguishing the roles of the legislative and executive
branches becomes more difficult. The situations to which a given policy
must be applied are so numerous and diverse that they cannot be predicted
with either accuracy or completeness. The result of a broad, statutory
delegation of legislative authority is that policy is made by the executive
with only the most general guidance, whereas, if the statute is narrowly
drawn the frequent occurrence of unforeseen circumstances requires con'THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison).
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No. 47 (J. Madison) (emphasis in original).
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tinual resort to additional legislation, and the actual enforcement or
application of a policy, i.e. the executive function, comes to be carried out
by the legislature through a series of ad hoc enactments. However, the
source of most separation of powers difficulties in this field is more often
an inability to articulate policy, rather than a failure to identify and concur
with the objective of the policy. In this atmosphere close cooperation
between the legislative and executive branches is necessary if either is to
exercise its powers responsibly, and the distinction between the branches
becomes blurred. However, because policy is clear, though its applications
cannot be foreseen, and because the legislature's responsibility for making
policy is unquestioned, cooperation rather than confrontation is more
frequently the result of the blending of roles.
In developing and carrying out social welfare legislation and programs,
the difficulties of articulating policies are compounded by the added
difficulties of determining which policies will realize desirable goals and
which goals are desirable. Since such legislation has not been directed at
any objective more specific than the improvement of society as a whole,
and since the value of particular aspects of social welfare has not been the
subject of general agreement, social welfare legislation over the past decade
has too frequently been a combination and compromise of inconsistent
policies rather than a majority coalition of interests. Inasmuch as modern
society is not a single ongoing project capable of improvement by any one
program or policy, our failures in this connection should come as no
surprise; society is the coexistence of many values, most of which can be
more fully realized only at the cost of giving up others. Unless a policy is
developed in awareness of the balance of the component values that make
up society as a whole and as a conscious effort to alter that balance, it will
quite likely contain latent inconsistencies.
In short, social welfare
legislation, like society, frequently represents a balance and compromise of
values, not the isolated search for one value.
Policy is not easily agreed upon in such a context, and a common
practice has been to ignore problems rather than face them. 4 However,
4

Two recent pieces of legislation serve to illustrate this practice. First, the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (Supp. V 1975), prohibiting "unreasonable" discrimination on the basis of age in federally assisted programs, has a deferred effective
date of January 1, 1979. Before that time, the Civil Rights Commission is required to make a
study of the implications of the statute for different federal programs. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp.
V 1975). One would think that these matters should have been considered prior to enacting
legislation to address the problem.
Second, Amendments Relating to the Social Security Act § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)
(Supp. V 1975), provides that in certain circumstances the mother of a child receiving benefits
under a state's welfare program need not cooperate with the state in establishing the child's
paternity. Members of the Congress could not agree on what circumstances warrant a refusal
to cooperate. See, e.g., Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(1975) (where Congress included in an earlier bill no exceptions to the requirement to
cooperate). The result was to excuse non-cooperation where there was "good cause." It is now
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when a program is put into effect and a general policy with internal
inconsistencies is applied to specific situations, those inconsistencies which
have been submerged in the legislative process and forgotten amidst the
smiles at the signing ceremony will inevitably come to the surface. Under
those circumstances, the legislature, which has not only been unable to
articulate its policy completely and accurately, but has also been unwilling
to agree on what its policy is in a conceptually valid way, finds itself in a
confrontation with the executive which it cannot constructively resolve. In
this situation the doctrine of separation of powers is frequently invoked in
a defensive way as one branch attempts to blame the other for flaws in an
ill-conceived or poorly administered program; the doctrine appears as a
justification for an abdication of responsibility rather than for the exercise
of responsibility without improper interference. When the separation of
powers is invoked as a resort for the weak instead of as a restraint on the
strong, the dignity of the doctrine is diminished. Furthermore, its integrity
is genuinely endangered when it is used to pass the buck.
The separation of judicial and executive power also becomes more
difficult to maintain in a government engaged in the administration of
social welfare programs. When a statement of policy is clear and the
internal inconsistencies of a program are few, it is not only easier for the
judiciary to interpret the law but also harder for it to do anything but that.
However, when, as frequently occurs in social welfare legislation, policies
are enacted in an incomplete fashion, the judiciary has the same problems
in interpreting the law as the executive has in enforcing it; the questions
which the legislature was able to avoid must inevitably be faced. The
judiciary is thus also forced into making policy and with similarly
unsatisfactory results. The only difference is that in the case of judicial
policymaking, not only legislative but also executive authority is being
encroached upon inasmuch as the executive may argue that authority to
make policy was delegated to it. In the area of social welfare legislation,
where congressional enactments are characteristically broad and often
ambiguous, the courts are evolving a very high standard for the executive to
meet in making policy. This standard has operated in the short run to give
the courts more apparent authority over policy in social welfare programs
than is proper or desirable. In the long run, the executive will likely to be
able to comply with the high standard set by the judiciary. Therefore, its
application may mean a permanent shift in policymaking responsibility
from the legislative to the executive branch sanctioned by the judiciary.
up to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine what constitutes "good
cause" by promulgating a regulation. See notice of proposed rulemaking on "Good Cause for
Refusing to Cooperate," 41 Fed. Reg. 34,299 (1976) (rules to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 232).
Comments received on the proposed rule indicate that interested persons have merely
transferred their dispute to a new forum, one less well prepared to resolve policy differences in
a credible fashion.

1977]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The increasing complexity of social welfare program administration
and the necessary growth of a large bureaucracy to carry out these programs
has had a different effect on the relationship between the judiciary and the
executive.
The difficulties of managing a large bureaucracy, often
involving several levels of government and coordination of a number of
departments and agencies, are proverbial. Slowness, incompetence and
outright opposition to the policy proposed to be carried out are the most
frequently cited obstacles to the effective delivery of services, though there
are many others. Nevertheless, no simple method exists to provide medical
service to fifty million people or to assure that two hundred million people
enjoy the exercise of their civil rights free from discrimination. When the
bureaucracy rather than the individual bears the primary responsibility for
the realization of either constitutional rights or statutory entitlements, the
defects of the vehicle appear in a different perspective, one with serious
implications for the separation of judicial and executive power. It is
unquestionably the responsibility of the executive branch, not the judiciary, to administer the programs of the government. But in fashioning a
remedy for a class deprived of its rights by the nature of the bureaucracy
relied on to enforce them, little can be done unless the court is willing to
assume the responsibility for running the bureaucracy on a daily basis. In
sum, the increasingly frequent intervention of the courts in social welfare
programs is to remedy wrongs which result from incapacity rather than
misunderstanding or perversity. In those rare circumstances where a
method exists to provide a remedy, the doctrine of separation of powers is
invariably modified.
A FEw EXAMPLES
At this point it is useful to examine more closely a number of specific
incidents and developments in the area of social welfare legislation and
program administration which involve the doctrine of separation of
powers. This will serve to illustrate several of the ideas already presented
and to provide concrete situations for consideration. These examples may
also suggest some of the advantages and disadvantages in certain approaches to social welfare programs in a government concerned about
separation of powers.
Two Different Approaches to Social Welfare Legislation: Health
Insurance and Elementary and Secondary Education
The underlying conception of legislation is the single most critical
element in determining the success of a program in the social welfare area.
*A program has made a promising start when its underlying policy is
unambiguously understood and has the coherence which comes from
addressing related problems consistently and distinct problems, if addressed
at all, separately. The policy which the law is to embody, if expressed in an
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intellectually coherent manner before legislative language is drafted, shines
through the words of the statute and operates as a constructive, because
consistent, guide to their meaning. But when legislation contains no
policy, or where it embodies a compromise of several possibly inconsistent
policies, drafting skill alone will not develop an easily administered
program. Federal health insurance legislation, embodied in Titles XVIII
and XIX of the Social Security Act,5 is illustrative of the first sort of
lawmaking, and federal programs to promote elementary and secondary
education programs 6 reflect the second situation. It is no surprise that
the operation of the doctrine of separation of powers is remarkably
different in these two areas of federal activity, although the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare is responsible for the administration of
both sets of programs.
While it would be easy to exaggerate the simplicity and coherence of
the Medicare and Medicaid statutes, Titles XVIII and XIX do enact a
comprehensive health insurance program to address a discrete problem
which can be rationally distinguished from other problems. The problem
to which these programs are directed is the inability of elderly and lowincome persons who are typically beneficiaries of social insurance or cash
assistance programs to afford adequate health care. Title XVIII establishes
several overriding principles for the operations of the health insurance
program for the aged and the disabled. 7 Title XIX establishes a comparable
federal-state program to assure access to medical services for low-income
persons.'
542 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
6
See, e.g., statutes cited at notes 18-22 infra.
7
The act prescribes a reimbursement pattern, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f, 1395g (1970); identifies
eligible institutions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e)-(j), 1395cc, 1395mm (Supp. V 1975); stipulates
freedom of choice by patients of qualified providers, 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1970); and prohibits
interference with the practice of medicine by the program administrators, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
(1970). Additionally, the act empowers the Secretary to "prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this title." 42
U.S.C. § 1395hh (1970). The act also authorizes appropriations adequate to support the
program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w (Supp. V 1975). Moreover, in just under one hundred pages of
text Title XVIII completes the role of the legislative branch in the establishment of a program
currently costing over $20 billion annually. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
BuDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 156 (n.d.).

'A permanent appropriation is made for Title XIX in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970), and the
Secretary's authority to "publish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, as
may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [he] is charged
under this Act," 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), is available to fill out the details of a generally stated
policy. Beyond mandating certain services and establishing specific formulas for reimbursement rates, the law generally leaves to the Secretary the responsibility for imposing additional
requirements on the states, and through them, on the providers of services and the
beneficiaries. The principles of state administration and federal reimbursement, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a, 1396b (Supp. V 1975); of the priority of certain kinds of services, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13) (Supp. V 1975); and of utilization review, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(26), (30), (31) (Supp.
V 1975), are set forth along with some others, but the legislature did not feel it was necessary
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The Medicare and Medicaid legislation has not, of course, produced a
trouble free program because the programs are too large and the problems
they address are too diverse and complex. Fraud and abuse have plagued
the administration of these programs, 9 especially Medicaid, from the
beginning, and the impact which such abuses have had on the cost of
health care has been highly undesirable.10 Nevertheless, two things may be
said in praise of these programs. First, they have unquestionably increased
the availability of needed health care to the elderly and the low-income
population. Second, the legislative and executive branches have generally
cooperated over the ten year history of these programs, and each has
understood its proper role in the program, as well as the limitations of that
role." Because the objectives and principles governing the programs were
clear and coherent, the Secretary, in exercising the broad authority
delegated to him, has been able to perform his role with confidence that his
performance is consistent with the overall policy of the programs. At the
same time, Congress has had confidence that it dealt with a problem it
wished to address in a way which, though not without disadvantages, was
on the whole satisfactory; Congress has allowed the Secretary to administer
the program within the broad guidelines it established.
It is no coincidence that in the decade of their operation, although
some significant changes have been made in the programs by additional
legislation, especially that involving utilization review requirements, 12 no
fundamental changes in the principles underlying Titles XVIII and XIX
have been adopted by Congress.
On the other hand, federal legislation concerning elementary and
secondary education over the past decade has been the source of continuing
friction between the legislative and executive branches. A brief survey of
this body of law indicates the nature of the difficulties which have attended
its administration.
to go beyond that point. In less than thirty pages of text, Title XIX completes the role of the
legislative branch in the establishment of a program currently costing nearly $10 billion
annually. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT &BUDGET, U.S. BUDGET IN BRIEF 1978, at 44 (n.d.).
9
See, e.g., The Federal Health Care Programs: Medicare and Medicaid, 53 CONG. DIG.
164, 164-65 (1974) (for a discussion of congressional concern over fraud and abuse in the two
health programs).
'0 See id. (for a discussion of rising costs).
"A distinct exception to this pattern has been the experience of HEW in administering
section 1903(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (Supp. V 1975). In its narrow focus,
complexity and rigid detail this section is not characteristic of Title XIX and might well have
been the source of separation of powers problems in any circumstances. The intense interest
of Congressman John E. Moss, who has his own peculiar views about the proper role of
congressional oversight committees, in the administration of this section made some conflicts
inevitable. The general spirit of cooperation which has attended the execution of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs is evident from the absence of fundamental amendments
enacted. Virtually no policies adopted by regulation have been subsequently reversed by
legislation.
12See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(26), (30), (31) (Supp. V 1975).
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Unlike the federal health insurance legislation, federal legislation for
elementary and secondary education programs is not directed towards any
overriding objective.13 This legislation operates, of course, in a field where
state and local government and private spending is larger than federal
spending by a factor of ten and where local interest and control are
traditionally strong. 4 It is therefore not altogether surprising that with the
16
5
exception of the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI1 and Title IX,
the federal government has quite simply failed to identify a broad problem
which a consensus recognizes as its responsibility to address and remedy,
much less a comprehensive solution. While the largest portion of federal
dollars is directed at increasing educational opportunities for low-income
and other disadvantaged persons, the role of the federal government in the
overall national effort to further that goal is manifestly so small and the
legislation reflects so many other priorities, that it is impossible to believe
7
that such an objective is the touchstone of federal policy in this field.
The lack of coherence in federal education legislation is revealed by a
review of its objectives and methods. Some laws are directed toward
assisting in the education of certain groups of students, such as lowincome, Indians and handicapped.' 8 Another set of programs is aimed at
institutions to be assisted, such as state and local educational agencies,
libraries and training centers. 19 Yet a third group, two examples of which
are the Bilingual Education Act 20 and the Emergency School Aid Act, 21 is

directed towards ameliorating specific circumstances in which institutions
or students find themselves. A fourth set is directed toward improving
educational instruction in certain subjects, such as ethnic heritage, environ'22
mental education, mathematics and "other critical subjects.
The methods prescribed for administering these programs do not
suggest any effort on the part of the legislature to develop a comprehensive
policy. Some are administered through state or local educational agencies, 23 some through other institutions 24 and some directly by the Office of
13See notes 30-42 infra & text accompanying.
4
E.g., federal spending for schools in 1973-74 was $4.9 billion, as compared to a total of
$58.2 billion spent.

NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS OF STATE SCHOOL SYSTEMS 1973-74, at 11 (1976).

STATISTCS (DEPT OF HEW).

1142 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1970).

1620 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Supp. 11 1972).
7

1 See notes 18-26 infra & text accompanying.
1820 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (1970); 20 U.S.C. § 887c (Supp. H 1972); 20 U.S.C. § 1221f-g
(Supp. II 1972); 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1970).
19E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 861 et seq. (1970); 20 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970).
2020 U.S.C. § 880b (1970).
2120 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
22
E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 900a (Supp. I1 1972); 20 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1970); 20 U.S.C.
§ 441 23et seq. (1970).
E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (1970).
2
1E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. V 1975).
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Education.2 5 Opportunities for public participation are provided at
different points in different programs, in some not at all; advisory
committees are required to be established and reports prepared on the
25
performance of programs completely at random.
In short, there is a largely unrelated series of enactments, uninformed
by any articulated policy, representing, it seems, no more than the fleeting
preferences of senior members of Congress or the preoccupations of junior
members.
This legislation represents the failure of policymakers to
formulate policy without any corresponding restraint in making law.
It might seem, without full consideration, that the enactment of
specific programs rather than general policy would simplify the task of the
executive branch in administering the law and would diminish the causes
of friction between the branches. In fact, however, the opposite is the case.
Lacking the conception of a general policy to guide the administrator in
carrying out the provisions of its education legislation, Congress has
sought to compensate by enacting detailed mandatory requirements and
prohibitions which restrict executive discretion.2 7 Both because it is
impossible to anticipate each potentially undesirable application of the
statute and because in dealing with those situations which are but dimly
perceived the rigidity of mandatory provisions is too frequently inadequate
for the subtleties of life, this practice in itself has been unsatisfactory from
all standpoints. Accordingly, Congress has felt it necessary to exercise
28
control over the administration of education programs in other ways.
25

The so-called "bypass" provisions are typical. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241e-1 (Supp. IV

1974).
26

Compare, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 887e (Supp. IV 1974), which requires local education
agencies to hold public hearings before applying for assistance, with 20 U.S.C. § 900a-4 (Supp.
IV 1974), which establishes a fifteen member National Advisory Council on Ethnic Heritage
Studies, with 20 U.S.C. § 1864(g) (Supp. IV 1974), which calls for a National Advisory Council
for Career Education with a partially predetermined membership and a highly specific
description of responsibilities, with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1866(f), (g) (Supp. IV 1974), which establishes
an Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs and requires two annual reports to
the Congress, one from the Commissioner and one from the Council, with 20 U.S.C. § 1867
(Supp. IV 1974), which sets up an Arts Education Program with neither an advisory council
nor any required reports, with 20 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1970), which authorizes the
Environmental Education Program with an advisory council, calls for no reports but does
require publication of a list of projects supported, such list to be distributed to "interested
educational institutions, citizens groups, conservation organizations, and other organizations
and individuals involved in enhancing environmental quality and maintaining ecological
balance." 20 U.S.C. § 1535 (1970).
27Detailed prescriptions for the operation of education programs are evident throughout
the legislation thus far reviewed. Prohibitions on the Commissioner's discretion are collected
at 20 28U.S.C. § 1231 Supp. V 1975.
The authority placed in advisory committees and the requirements for reports
previously referred to, see note 26 supra & text accompanying, are symptomatic of the
uncoordinated congressional efforts in this connection. Another noteworthy element is the
detailed prescription of the organizational structure of the Office of Education, often
including the specification of exact salary levels for subordinate employees. See, e.g., 20
U.S.C. § 1221f (Supp. II 1972); 20 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(1) (1970); 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (1970).
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Among the methods by which the legislature attempts to control the
executive in the administration of education programs, the most important
is the review of regulations provided for in section 431 of the General
Education Provisions Act. 29 Significantly, such an elaborate provision for
congressional review of administrative action has not been felt necessary in
other social welfare programs where far broader discretion is delegated to
the executive.30 Briefly, section 431 provides that any policy which the
Commissioner of Education adopts in the administration of the education
programs must be submitted to Congress prior to taking effect. The
Commissioner's policy goes into effect unless congress finds that it "is
inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority," and
disapproves it.31 In practice, over the two years of the section's existence no
policy has been disapproved, although the constitutional validity of the
section is an open question. The point to observe here, however, is the felt
need for additional control over policymaking which section 431 represents. The need arises, it is evident, not because the executive branch
perversely misinterprets the expressed policy of the legislative branch, but
because, not having included policy in its legislation, the congressional
responsibility to determine the effects of its actions can only be satisfied by
legislative interference in program administration.
Judicial Control of Policymaking for
Social Welfare Programs in the Executive Branch
Policymaking, of course, is properly the role of the legislative branch.
In view of the growing complexity of social welfare programs and the
diversity of circumstances which they must address, with the significant
exception of education legislation, the legislature has tended over the past
decade to express its policies ever more broadly and to leave to the
executive branch the task of filling in the details.3 2 This practice of relying
on the executive branch to develop the methods of applying general
policies to specific situations was usefully adopted in the field of economic
regulation;3 3 it has characteristically been carried out by rulemaking.
Within constitutional restraints, policymaking by legislative bodies in
the social and economic fields is a loosely regulated process. The policy
that is actually decided upon must be within the authority of the legislature
2920 U.S.C. § 1232 (Supp. V 1975).
30

See, e.g., notes 7-12 supra & text accompanying. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
3120 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
32
Prominent among recent enactments in this regard are the provisions to forbid
discrimination against the handicapped and the aged in federal programs. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (Supp. III 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
33
See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V 1975) (Federal Trade
Commission); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) (National Labor Relations Board); 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970)
(Interstate Commerce Commission).
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to enact, and distinctions contained in legislation must be supportable,
34
though not expresly supported, by a conceivable rational basis.
However, it is the substance of the enactment, not the procedure through
which it was derived, that is the measure of its validity. That no hearings
may have been held, that all testimony received was opposed to a law as
passed, that no explanation of the reasons supporting a law is available,
that the explanation which does appear suggests misunderstanding or
ignorance of the issues involved - none of these factors affects the validity
of an enactment concededly within legislative authority.
When the legislature delegates the authority to make policy to the
executive branch, the question of whether a policy or rule is within the
authority delegated remains of central importance. In addition, procedural
requirements must be met. In the field of social welfare programs, recent
years have seen a significant increase in the importance which both
administrators and courts have attached to following proper procedures in
making policy in the executive branch.35 The result is that the executive
branch now must make policy through a process which bears more
resemblance to judicial proceedings than legislative ones. This has
important implications for the timeliness with which policy can be made
and also, potentially at least, for the degree of influence that the judiciary
exercises over the outcome.
The Administrative Procedure Act3 6 does not by its terms apply to the
executive branch rulemaking which involves grants and benefits. It is
precisely this type of activity that is involved in the administration of social
welfare programs.
As a result of a recommendation made by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, however, most agencies,
including the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, began in 1971
to comply voluntarily with the Act's requirements for promulgation of
rules affecting all their programs.3 7 The courts have also held the executive
departments to the requirements they imposed on themselves,38 and it is at
least arguable that a similar requirement might have been imposed by the
courts in any event.3 9 The reasonableness of increasingly frequent public
demands for an opportunity to participate effectively in policymaking in
the executive branch has impressed executive officials no less than it has
impressed judges, and both have responded.
34
See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485
(1970).
3
SFor a discussion of the procedures which must be followed, see notes 54-68 infra & text
accompanying.
365 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
37
See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971) (indicating that as a matter of policy, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare will use rulemaking procedures adopted from the APA
where not required by law); 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804 (indicating the Department of Agriculture's
voluntary adoption of APA rulemaking procedures).
38
See Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39
See Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1976).
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The Administrative Procedure Act combined with existing executive
branch practice provides that in making policy agencies shall proceed by
rulemaking and that in making rules some record of the proceedings shall
be established. 40 This record will normally include, at a minimum, notice
of proposed rulemaking, comments received by the agency in response to
the notice and a final rule which should be combined with a general
statement of its "basis and purpose." 4' Courts reviewing the rules made by
agencies may set them aside where, among other things, they are found to
be arbitrary or capricious, or beyond the agency's authority. 42 Courts
review "the whole record" of the rulemaking proceedings in determining
43
whether to set agency rules aside.
There are two major features in this scheme which establish a pattern
of judicial review of policymaking in the executive branch that differs from
the traditional role of the courts in reviewing legislative enactments. The
first element is the requirment that the court determine the validity of
agency action on "the whole record." 44 While policy made in the
legislative branch is valid if based on a conceivable rationale which may be
proposed long after enactment, a series of cases, of which Rodway v. United
States Department of Agriculture* is the leading representative, has now
held that the requirement that the court's review be based on "the whole
record" means that post hoc rationales are of next to no weight in support
of policy made in the executive branch. 46 The record which must support
the rule is that which was developed and published contemporaneously
with the rule. Potential authority, in short, is not in itself an adequate
basis for making policy in the executive branch; it must be accompanied by
47
positive justification at the time the policy is made.
The second element is the interpretation which courts have recently put
on the requirement that agencies accompany their final rules with a
statement of "basis and purpose." Recently, courts have held that unless
4°See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (prescribing the form of rulemaking). For the requirements
on the executive branch which bind it to the procedure outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 553, see note 37
supra.
415 U.S.C. §553(c) (1970).
425 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
43d. See also note 46 infra.
44ld.

45514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4"The highly critical approach taken in Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975), toward post hoc rationalizations grew out of Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Mathews, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court did review a post hoc rationalization and
found it inadequate. In Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), the court asserted that it had "every right to be
suspicious" of such rationalizations, though not explicitly to ignore them. And in Exxon
Corp. v. Federal Energy Administration, 398 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1975), the court adhered
to the Rodway principle by not permitting the introduction of "new reasons" in support of a
rule, 47
though it did allow the agency to provide an explanation of "stated reasons."
See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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this "basis and purpose" statement responds to comments that have been
made on the proposed rule and establishes, in light of the whole record
that the final rule is "reasonable," the rule will be set aside as "arbitrary"
and an "abuse of discretion." 48 Thus, in Maryland v. Mathews, 49 a court
set aside as "arbitrarily established" tolerance levels for error rates in state
administered AFDC programs. While it was conceded that a specific
tolerance level could be established within the Secretary's authority under
the Social Security Act, "the tolerance level set must be reasonable and
supported by a factual basis ... ,"5o Significantly, the burden of showing
reasonableness is on the policymaker; the court referred to the absence of
any "empirical study," rejected as inadequate other information relied
upon by the Secretary, concluded that there remained no basis in the record
for establishing the levels or evidence tending to indicate their reasonableness and set the rule aside.
Two serious implications for the doctrine of separation of powers arise
from these developments:
First, there is the decisive role, albeit a negative one, which the
judiciary has come to play in the policymaking process by introducing the
requirement of a contemporaneous demonstration of a rule's "reasonableness" into its review of an agency's action. Inasmuch as the courts
have not yet indicated what showing will meet the burden of demonstrating reasonableness, they have temporarily arrogated to themselves the
authority to set aside virtually any rule that they find undersirable. This
situation is inconsistent with the traditional role of the judiciary, and it is
unlikely to persist. However, even when the standard of reasonableness is
finally refined and the showing required to meet that standard is
established, it is clear that the standard will be a high one and that the
burden of meeting it will remain on the executive branch. These facts
alone assure a continuing major role for the judiciary in policymaking for
social welfare programs.
Second, even assuming that the role of the judiciary in executive
policymaking is reduced from a decisive to merely a highly influential one,
the character of policymaking in the executive branch will have been
transformed from largely legislative to judicial in nature. Consequently,
instead of policy determination as a matter of preference within a range of
authority, policy must now be based on a material record. Facts, not
philosophy, determine outcomes in those circumstances; genuine policy
choices are replaced by requirements to determine the weight of the evidence.
'$See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, '533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Amoco Oil Co. v.
EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Maryland v. Mathews, 415 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976).
49415 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976).
50
1d. at 1212.
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Perhaps general policies enacted by the legislature will be better carried
out when subsidiary questions are resolved by reference to facts rather than
policy. This is a matter of opinion influenced by one's view of the
legislature's original delegation of responsibility to the executive branch. If
this delegation represents a genuine desire to share the job of policymaking, there is cause to regret the loss of efficiency and the diminished
capacity to administer programs on the basis of hope as well as experience;
if it represents an undesirable but inevitable outgrowth of an attempt to
deal with the diverse and complex issues of social welfare, one may
welcome the restraint which a formal process imposes on irresponsible
bureaucrats. In any case, the transformation of policymaking into the
structure of adjudication increases the control which the judiciary exercises
over the outcome tremendously. If policy is truly being made, however,
and this process is merely masqueraded as adjudication, the increased
importance of the judiciary in the process resulting from the disguise seems
at best inappropriate.
Judicial Control of Program Administration
Social welfare programs are, by their very nature, ongoing. Their
administration involves continuous effort to improve certain conditions
which persist in society as a whole and whose effect on individuals varies
with time. The ability of the programs to improve the conditions to which
they are addressed depends on, among other factors, their design, the
dedication and skill of those charged with administering them, and the
tractability of the problems. These programs also tend to be complex. The
number and sort of institutions which deal with social welfare and the
multiple circumstances in which the conditions to be remedied are found
require flexibility in approach.
Coordination with other levels of
government and private institutions is essential.
Finally, it should be observed that social welfare programs touch upon
the most fundamental rights of individual beneficiaries: health, financial
resources, the right to be free from discrimination. Legislation operates
typically to entitle certain persons to certain rights or assistance in certain
circumstances. To secure those rights, a bureaucracy is established to
interact with all the other elements in the social welfare universe; there is
no alternative for administering social welfare programs in a country as
large as the United States. The complexity of the programs requires that
expertise be developed and preserved, and the size of the programs
precludes their administration without considerable staffing.
When citizens are entitled, whether by statute or under the Constitution, to be treated in a certain way, it is the special function of the
judiciary to determine citizens' rights where they are in doubt and to
fashion a remedy that will secure them. As the number of rights or benefits
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to which people are legally entitled has increased dramatically in the social
welfare area and the method of securing them has come to rely on the
performance of a bureaucracy, the courts have experienced new difficulties
in fulfilling their traditional responsibility.5 1 Class action lawsuits have
compounded these difficulties. Courts have reacted to these developments
in different ways, none without its disadvantages. One case in the civil
rights area and a series of cases in the welfare field have significant
implications for the doctrine of separation of powers and are illustrative of
the difficulties which the courts and the executive branch have experienced.
Adams v. Richardson 2 involved a class action brought to compel the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to alter his manner of
enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act5 5 in a number of states which had
previously maintained dual school systems. The statute authorized, indeed
required, the Secretary to seek to achieve a series of integrated school
systems by voluntary means wherever possible. It also specifically
contemplated that where voluntary methods were unsuccessful he would
initiate formal proceedings leading to the termination of federal financial
assistance to non-complying school districts or states. 4 The court found
that the Secretary's practice, as demonstrated in the record, of seeking
compliance with the statute exclusively through voluntary means was
inconsistent with the scheme of enforcement contemplated by the statute;
that segregation or vestiges of the dual system of education persisted as a
result; and that plaintiffs, minority residents of the relevant states, were
thereby being deprived of their rights under Title VI.
It was, of course, the basic responsibility of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare and his Office of Civil Rights to enforce Title VI.
The court in this case could have concluded that the Secretary erroneously
believed that he had discretion to decline to initiate formal proceedings to
cut off funds, as he argued, and that since the court had corrected his
misunderstanding of his obligations under the law, an order in general
terms requiring him to proceed formally where voluntary negotiations had
broken down would be adequate to correct the situation. For a variety of
reasons, the court decided not to adopt this approach.
Instead, the court issued a multifaceted order establishing detailed
guidelines for the Office of Civil Rights' enforcement program regarding
Title VI in seventeen states and hundreds of school districts. The order,
among other things, established fixed time periods for pursuing efforts at
voluntary compliance in specific school districts where a violation of Title
51

See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); notes 52-63 infra
text
accompanying.
52480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5342 U.S.C. §q 2000d-2000d-4 (1970).
51 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court found that the
implication came from the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (Supp. V 1975).
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VI had been found, after which enforcement proceedings were required to
be initiated. Different timetables were established for dealing with other
institutions. The Office was required to report to the court semiannually
on its progress, as well as on its treatment of new complaints .of
discrimination received from the geographical area covered in the order.
Where the Office had failed to act on a complaint within a specified period
of time, an explanation was required by the order. 55
The court reviewed the Office of Civil Rights' compliance with the
order on a continuing basis. The specific administrative proceedings that
were ordered to be undertaken either took place or the cases were settled
satisfactorily. However, other aspects of the Office's enforcement program,
among them the treatment of complaints, failed to meet the expectations of
56
the plaintiffs or the court, and further relief was ordered two years later.
57
Formal proceedings were initiated in more cases as a result of that order,
but the most interesting aspect of the order for the purposes of this
discussion was its provision regulating the Office's complaint processing
procedures. The court ordered that the Office, within 180 days of receipt of
a complaint of racial discrimination within the seventeen state area
involved in the case, either determine the complaint to be without merit,
secure voluntary compliance where the complaint has merit or commence
enforcement proceedings. 58 The court evidently felt compelled to take over
the administration of the complaint processing program in order to secure
for plaintiffs the rights to which they were entitled. It perceived that the
best way to do this was to control the timeframes for the performance of
specified functions. However, the very essence of an executive decision is
the allocation of limited resources in the most effective manner. The most
recent development in Adams v. Richardson59 illustrates the identity of
judge and administrator even more strikingly.
It will be remembered that Adams dealt only with racial discrimination, in only one type of government program, educational, and in fewer
than half the states of the union. The Office of Civil Rights, at the same
time, has a limited staff which is required to enforce many other
antidiscrimination statutes on a nationwide basis for most social welfare
programs. As it developed, the staff of the Office was not large enough to
deal with all the complaints it received on the same basis as that ordered by
the court in 1975. A large backlog of complaints accumulated in other
program areas and from states not covered by the order. Two facts became
S5 This order was issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia on February
See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973).
16, 1973.
56
This subsequent relief was ordered on March 14, 1975. See Adams v. Weinberger, 391
F. Supp.
269 (D.D.C. 1975).
57
See id. (for a listing of cases).
5
Id. at 273.
59
See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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obvious to the Director of the Office of Civil Rights early in 1976. First,
compliance with the Adams order was preventing him from adopting a
balanced enforcement program which would focus limited staff on problems of the greatest magnitude and significance. Second, as the resources
he could devote to non-Adams complaints diminished, he became increasingly vulnerable to other suits which would result in orders of similar relief
involving other aspects of his responsibility. 60 This situation could not
long persist.
The role of the Adams court in the development of the operating plan
was critical; it is not conceivable that the Office of Civil Rights would have
.developed the same plan without the Adams suit. A factor illustrated in'the
Adams case which is at least as interesting as the changing -attitude of the
Office of Civil Rights, however, is the changing role of the court over time.
The court recognized in its first order that to secure plaintiffs' "rights in a
-class action suit of this kind, specific control of executive branch actions
over a period of time -was required. In its specificity and rigidity, however,
the original order was traditionally judicial in nature. The court's order of
June, 1976, is something quite different. The court has essentially secured
the plaintiffs' -rights by ordering the Office of Civil Rights -to pursue the
most effective plan it can develop toward carrying out its responsibilities,
and it has tacitly conceded that plaintiffs' rights, at least as a class, are
measured by what can be achieved by the best efforts of the executive
branch given the available resources. In ordering the plan into effect, the
court has determined what can instead of what should be done; it has
exchanged the judicial role for an executive one.
The Director's solution was to develop a comprehensive enforcement
plan that would establish timeframes for treating complaints in all
programs and in all states on the same schedule, a schedule which was
specifically related to the number of staff members he anticipated would be
available to him. This is, of course, typical and sound administrative
practice. This plan was submitted to the court in Adams and adopted in
substance by that court in a modification of its order in June, 1976.61 What
the court ordered the Office of Civil Rights to do in Title VI cases in the
seventeen states involved in Adams was essentially what the Office's
operating plan now calls for in the absence of an order, and what it does in
other cases as a matter of course.
Courts have faced similar issues in a number of recent cases 62 in which
plaintiffs, usually as a class, have complained that the Social Security
Administration has not expeditiously granted their request for a hearing,
6

oSee, e.g., Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C. 1976).
No. 3095-76 (D.D.C. June 14, 1976) (unreported opinion).
62
See White v. Mathews, No. H-75-34 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1976); Blankenship v. Mathews,
No. 75-185 (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
61
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after an initial denial, to determine their rights to benefits under Title II,
the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Program, 63 or Title XVI,
64
the Supplemental Security Income Program, of the Social Security Act.
Because the number of administrative law judges who can hold such
hearings is limited, some applicants have recently had to wait a year or
more for a hearing. The question in the cases that have been brought is
typically what period of delay is reasonable and what is the judge to do
when he finds that an unreasonable amount of time has been taken. The
statute does not specifically establish any time within which a hearing
must be held. With regard to Title XVI, however, it does require, except in
disability cases, that a decision be made within ninety days of the time
when the hearing is requested, 65 manifestly, the hearing on which the
decision is to be based should also take place within that time.
Inasmuch as the backlog of cases awaiting hearings in the Social
Security Administration was 113,000 in April, 1975, and the average
waiting period over the year previous to that time between a request for a
hearing and a decision was slightly over six months, 66 there have been more
than a few court cases seeking equitable relief for deprivation of the right to
a hearing given by the statute. The executive branch and the legislative
branch have both been acutely aware of the backlog and long delays.
Legislation specifically responsive to these problems within the program
was passed in January, 1976;67 it is significant that Congress, while
adopting a number of reforms in the program, did not approve any of the
proposals before it at that time requiring a hearing to be held within a
fixed time period, 6s precisely the relief sought by class action plaintiffs in
the courts. Within the limits of the resources made available by law, which
have themselves been increased, 69 great efforts have been made to speed the
process; these efforts have yielded considerable improvement, but the delays
have remained long enough to provoke a number of lawsuits.
Putting aside jurisdictional issues and class action certification questions - when the class if not certified even these cases become moot - in most
cases where plaintiffs have been the class of applicants requesting hearings
within a state, court rulings have differed. The two cases which found a
violation of plaintiffs' rights have also differed in the relief ordered.
Blankenship v. Mathews 70 resulted in an order that the agency hold
hearings for all Kentucky cases within ninety days of the request but
6342 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
6442 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
642 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
66
White v. Mathews, No. H-75-34 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1976).
6742 U.S.C. § 1383 (Supp. V 1975).
6
8See, e.g., H.R. 5276, 94th cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
69Social Security Act-Hearings and Review Procedures, Pub. L. No. 94-202, § 3, 89 Stat.
1135 (1976).
70
Blankenship v. Mathews, No. 75-185 (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
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deferred the time when this must be done until February 1, 1977. The
reason for the court's holding was that "in light of the defendant's
statement made to this court, that he hopes to be able to schedule all
hearings within 90 days after application (by February 1, 1977), we hold
that he should be compelled to adhere to that statement." 7' In other words,
as in Adams, 7 2 the relief granted was the best the executive branch could
offer under the supervision of the court. At the same time the court
considered and rejected two other possible remedial courses. First, it
declined to order immediate application of the ninety day rule because, in
view of the nationwide backlog and the finite resources of the program, to
do so either would have prolonged the process outside Kentucky if the
agency reassigned finite staff to Kentucky in response to the order or, if it did
73
not, would have diminished the quality of decisions within the state.
7
4
Second, it declined to follow the policy of Santos v. Weinberger, which
dealt with another aspect of the Supplemental Security Income program 75
and ordered the agency to pay those applicants benefits after the ninety day
period if a decision had not been reached. Indeed, the court in Blankenship
ordered only that hearings be held, not that decisions be made, and it seems
not to have contemplated the possibility that its order could not be
76
complied with.
White v. Mathews77 illustrates a more vigorous approach, though
with less discussion of its rationale. In White, the court ordered that
decisions are to be rendered within 180 days of an application for a hearing,
starting July 1, 1977; within 150 days, by December 31, 1977; and within
120 days, by July 1, 1978. An applicant whose case is not decided within
these time limitations, and who is a citizen of Connecticut, will be entitled
to benefits. The opinion states that there are ways of improving the
performance of the agency, but it does not identify the connection between
the improvements and the standards for performance that were in fact set.
Nor was the court concerned with the impact its order would have on
applicants not represented in the case before it.78 It may be that the court

71ld. slip op. at 8.
72Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7"Blankenship v. Mathews, No. 75-185, slip op. at 8-9 (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
7
'Santos v. Weinberger. No. 75-166G (D. Mass. 1975) (unreported).
7"Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 stat. 1465 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 25, 26, 29, 42,

43 U.S.C.).

"6Blankenship v. Mathews, No. 75-185, slip op. at 9 (W.b. Ky. May 6, 1976). This
attitude is in stiking contrast to that of the court in Solberg v. Mathews, No. 75-W-993 (D.
Colo. March 26, 1976) (unreported), where the court noted: "If I were to order them to get the
job done, they might as well come forward and plead guilty to contempt when the order is
entered, because there is no way they can do it."

"7No. H-75-34 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1976).
78d. slip op. at 16-17. The standard applied in Rodway v. United Stated Dep't of
Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975), requiring demonstration of a rule's reasonableness
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will yet-discover, as the Adams court has and the drafters of education
legislation in Congress have not, that it is important to address problems
comprehensively as well as vigorously. That, of course, is a lesson that is
driven home hardest to those who actually do carry out policies and
administer programs on a daily basis. As the judiciary becomes more
familiar with fashioning orders to the bureaucracy charged with the
execution of social welfare programs, its awareness of the problems
involved will undoubtedly increase.
There seems no reason to doubt, unless the class action form of
litigation to secure statutory and constitutional rights is severely restricted,
that courts will be increasingly drawn into the need to oversee the quality
of bureaucratic performance in delivery of those services to which the
public is entitled. There is one especially significant aspect of this recent
addition to the traditional functions of the judiciary. The courts in
Adams 79 and BlankenshipO have established the measure of plaintiff's rights
as those that the best administered program could provide. In White the
court ordered better administration while explicitly contemplating that it
might not be possible in practice. Neither of these situations is completely
satisfactory. These rights should not be subject to variation on a daily basis
or contingent on such a fragile factor as the competence or staffing levels of
a bureaucracy. Compliance with court orders should be not only possible
but also fully expected. Courts in their traditional role have done much to
establish both rights and court orders as objects of the greatest respect, and
that respect has been, in turn, a source of the judiciary's peculiar power and
effectiveness. Though it may be consistent with the laws of physics, it will
be a costly lesson indeed to learn that the judiciary's expanded responsibilities are accompanied in the long run by an attenuation of its authority
to carry them out.
CONCLUSION

Social welfare programs provide an interesting lens through which to
observe the variable operation of the doctrine of separation of powers. As
Madison foresaw, the doctrine is not new and should not become rigid if
governmental efforts to deliver social services are to be successful. More
than any others, social welfare programs require an environment in which
there is cooperation by each participant and respect for the considerable
obstacles which confront all those engaged in the venture.

and a "factual basis" supporting it, were evidently not applicable, in the opinion of the court,
to "judicial
rulemaking."
79
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80Blankenship v. Mathews, No. 75-185 (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976).
8lWhite v. Mathews, No. H-75-34 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1976).
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At the same time, social welfare law is young as the life of legislation is
measured, and it is evident that no clear patterns have been established for
the function of the different branches in the ten years during which the
government's efforts in this field have grown so dramatically. For every law
that rigidly defines and constricts administrative discretion, there is another
which confers extraordinary authority, and for each court that is impelled
to control the details of program administration to secure a plaintiff's
rights, another declines to interfere with matters committed to the executive
branch.
While this article has examined certain approaches to the
persistent questions raised by the separation of powers doctrine in the
context of recently enacted programs and has identified certain hazards
which they involve, it cannot be maintained that other approaches are
demonstrably preferable. It is likely that we will succeed in avoiding old
problems in this area only at the expense of creating new ones.
In this developing situation, the temptation to prescribe general
principles must be resisted. The history of the doctrine of separation of
powers has been one of accommodation to changing circumstances, and in
the emerging area of social welfare law this modest attitude is especially
appropriate. It bears emphasis that the achievement of the objectives of
most social welfare legislation is every bit as difficult as it is important.
The cooperation of all the branches of government and an understanding
of the exigencies that constrain their actions are essential. With that
understanding should come better performance by each branch of the
responsibilities that are properly its own.
The source of separation of powers problems in the social welfare area
is more frequently the failure of one branch to assume its responsibilities
and carry them out than an attempt to usurp the functions of others. Since
there is no further forum to which it can refer difficult problems, the
judiciary has not been reticent in this regard; Congress, however, has too often
abdicated its responsibility to make policy in a comprehensive and coherent
fashion, and the executive branch, in a number of instances and for a
variety of reasons, has failed to fully carry out the law. The performance of
its own responsibilities by each branch would greatly contribute toward
more effective social welfare programs and would also avoid conflicts with
the separation of powers doctrine. At present, executive branch policymaking infringes the role of the legislature, and court orders to bureaucracies directing the deployment of limited resources usurp the role of the
executive branch. Moreover, the executive branch is not as experienced in
making policy as the legislature, and the courts are not as well prepared or
skilled at administering programs as the executive. Finally, the proper
performance by each branch of its own role facilitates the exercise of
responsibility by the others. This is especially true of the administration
and interpretation of statutes, where a well conceived and professionally
drafted piece of legislation is of such immense importance to the overall
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success of a program. What is needed, in short, more than anything else if
separation of powers problems are to be avoided in social welfare
programs, is the confident exercise of responsibility by each branch of its
own functions. If that result is achieved, the outlook for social welfare
legislation is bright. But until it is achieved, it is doubtful that makeshift
adjustments in roles will produce effective programs over the long run.
The doctrine of separation of powers will continue to affect the
administration of social welfare programs and be affected itself for many
years. At the moment, the beginning of an evolutionary process has been
observed; the resolution of the particular problems that have been
identified is well into the future. The purpose of this article will have been
served if it has attracted notice to significant developments as an important
area of public law interacts with a fundamental principle of our government.

